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In this paper we further study the complexity of zero-knowledge interactive 
proofs. We prove that there is an oracle A such that there is a language L which 
is recognizable by a two round, perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof relative to 
A, but such that L# BPPA. This gives interesting implications for what can be 
demonstrated about zero-knowledge interactive proofs using standard methods. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Interactive proofs were independently introduced by Babai (1985) and 
Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff (1985). The class IP is defined through 
the computational model of an interactive prover-verifier pair. Both Turing 
machines in a pair receive a common input, w, and exchange up to a poly- 
nomial in 1 WI number of messages, each of length a polynomial in 1~1. The 
verifier’s moves and its final determination of whether to accept or reject w  
are the result of random polynomial time computations on w  and all 
messages sent so far. The prover has no resource bounds. A language, L, 
is in IP[f(n)] if there exists an interactive prover-verifier pair that on 
input w  exchanges at most f( 1 WI ) messages such that (1) when w  E L, the 
verifier interacting with the prover accepts with probability at least 
1-2-l”’ and (2) when w$ L, the verifier interacting with any prover 
accepts with probability at most 2- I”‘. Such a prover-verifier pair is called 
an interactive proof for L. Let IP = Uk IP[nk]. Just as in the case when 
LENP, when LEIP, membership is efficiently verifiable since the verifier 
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runs in polynomial time and determines membership correctly with proba- 
ility very close to one. However, IP is thought to strictly contain NP 
since Fortnow, Karloff, Lund, and Nissan (1989) have recently shown 
that IPI> PH and Shamir (1989) has subsequently improved this to 
IP = PSPACE. 
In addition to defining interactive proofs, Goldwasser, Micali, and 
Rackoff (1985) further defined zero-knowledge interactive proofs. The zero- 
knowledge definition was motivated by cryptographic considerations (see, 
for example, (Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff, 1989; Oren, 1987; 
Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson, 1986). Informally, a prover is zero- 
knowledge for a language if the prover reveals no useful information (other 
than language membership) when interacting with any verifier. Slightly 
more formally, a prover is zero-knowledge for L if for any verifier there is 
a probabilistic polynomial time simulator that, on inputs in L, produces 
conversations with the “same” probability distribution as the prover inter- 
acting with that verifier. Actually, three interpretations of “same” lead to 
three types of zero-knowledge, each more restrictive than the next. When 
“same” is informally interpreted as (1) identical, (2) almost identical, or (3) 
equivalent with respect to probabilistic polynomial time, then the prover is 
said to be perfect zero-knowledge, statistical zero-knowledge, or computa- 
tional zero-knowledge for L, respectively. A language, L, is in PZK 
(SZK, CZK) if there is an interacting prover-verifier pair which is an inter- 
active proof for L with the additional property that the prover is perfect 
(statistical, computational) zero-knowledge for L. 
In this paper we continue the investigation of the complexity-theoretic 
implications of the zero-knowledge definitions. Requiring that, for inputs in 
the language, the conversations between the prover and every verifier be 
accurately reproducible by some random polynomial time machine would 
seem to be a severe constraint on the power of the prover and hence the 
power of the zero-knowledge model. Surprisingly, for computational zero- 
knowledge this is probably not the case. Through the work of Goldreich, 
Micali, and Wigderson (1986); Ben Or et al., (1988); Impagliazzo and 
Yung (1987) it has been shown that, assuming secure encryption exists, any 
interactive proof can be transformed into a computational zero-knowledge 
proof, i.e., CZK = IP. 
However, the intuition that zero-knowledge is very restrictive seems to 
be correct for statistical and perfect zero-knowledge. Fortnow (1987) was 
the first to provide evidence that the statistical zero-knowledge requirement 
may restrict the power of the prover. He proved that if a language has a 
statistical zero-knowledge proof, then the complement of the language has 
a bounded round interactive proof, i.e., SZKsco-IP[2]. From this 
theorem we can deduce that it is unlikely that SZK contains of all NP since 
if NPcSZK then co-NPs IP[2], which further implies that the polyno- 
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mial time hierarchy collapses to IP[2] by (Boppana, Hastad, and Zachos, 
1987). 
While Fortnow’s result did imply that SZK is probably weaker than IP 
it still left open the possibility that SZK contained languages in IP which 
required a polynomial number of interactions. Aiello and Hastad (to 
appear) show that this cannot be the case. They prove that any language 
which is recognized by an unbounded round statistical zero-knowledge 
proof can also be recognized by a two round interactive proof, i.e., 
SZK cIP[2]. We should note that IP[2] c 17, (Babai, 1985). Hence, 
under the assumption that I72 # PSPACE, SZK # IP, that is, perfect or 
statistical zero-knowledge is a strong constraint on the power of interactive 
proofs with a polynomial number of rounds. Given this, a natural question 
to investigate is, “How weak are PZK and SZK?” 
There is strong evidence that PZK # BPP since Graph Isomorphism 
(GI), and Quadratic Residuosity (QR) are in PZK but have resisted all 
attempts to be placed in BPP. Furthermore, it is probably also true that 
PZK[4] # BPP since Quadratic Non-residuosity (QNR) and Graph Non- 
isomorphism (GNI) are known to be in PZK[4] but not in BPP. 
However, there are no known candidate languages in SZK[3] - BPP. In 
this paper we look for evidence that SZK[3] and languages lower in the 
zero-knowledge hierarchy are not trivially BPP. Our two main results are 
two oracles A and B such that SZKA[2] # BPPA and PZKB[2] # BPPB, 
respectively. The proofs require diagonalization arguments involving four 
types of computing devices: a prover, many verifiers, a simulator for each 
verifier, and all BPP machines. It is the only known oracle separation 
involving a zero-knowledge complexity class. 
The first result is weaker than the second but the former oracle seems to 
have the interesting property that SZK # PZK. Even though we cannot 
prove this last property there is still an interesting observation to be made. 
All known statistical zero-knowledge proofs have been converted to perfect 
zero-knowledge proofs by letting the simulator run for a long time with 
exponentially small probability. This procedure is not possible for our 
language. 
Additionally, our results in conjunction with a result of Oren (1987) give 
evidence that the original definition of zero-knowledge proposed in 
(Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff, 1985) is in fact less restrictive than the 
auxiliary input model proposed in several papers (Oren, 1987; Tompa and 
Wall, 1987; Goldwasser, Micah, and Rackoff, 1989). Oren showed that in 
the auxiliary input model CZK[2] = BPP. Oren also defined a blackbox 
zero-knowledge model and showed that it is at least as restrictive as the 
auxiliary input model. He noted that all known zero-knowledge protocols 
were in fact blackbox zero-knowledge. Our results hold in a model which 
is only sightly less restrictive than the blackbox model (and more restrictive 
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than the original definition). We can conclude that any proof of 
equivalence between these two models cannot relativize. 
In light of the above discussion we should mention that although there 
is good evidence that constant round blackbox zero-knowledge is not tri- 
vially BPP, Goldreich and Krawczyk (1989) have shown that the ability of 
the verifier to hide its random bits from the prover is crucial for this 
property. They show that any language which admits a constant round 
AM protocol which is blackbox zero-knowledge is in BPP (in an AM 
protocal (Babai, 1985) the verifier’s moves are just a specified number of 
random bits and its computation to accept the input given all the moves 
is deterministic). 
The content of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give the 
necessary definitions and notation. In Section 3 we construct an oracle such 
that SZKA[2] # BPPA and in Section 4 we show how to modify this 
construction to make the protocol perfect zero-knowledge. 
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
In this section we give the formal definitions needed for the paper. Let 
P denote a prover: any probabilistic Turing machine which has a “com- 
munication” tape (for a formal definition of a “communication” tape see 
(Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff, 1985). P has no resource bounds. Let V 
denote a verifier: any probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with a 
communication tape. Let PO V denote an interacting prover-verifier pair: 
any prover and verifier which share the same input tape and communica- 
tion tape (initially empty) and interact in rounds in the following way. 
(1) The verifier, V, makes a probabilistic polynomial time computa- 
tion based on the input, the contents of its memory, and all messages thus 
far received over the communication tape from the prover, P. 
(2) V transmits the result of the computation over the communication 
tape to P. We will denote the message sent by V in round i by xzi- 1. 
(3) P performs a probabilistic computation based on the input, and 
all messages thus far received over the communication tape from V. 
(4) P transmits the result of the computation over the communication 
tape to V. We will denote the message sent by P in round i by yzi. 
The interaction is terminated by the verifier accepting or rejecting after at 
most a polynomial (in the input length) number of rounds. 
Let Ptt V(w) denote a transcript of the interaction between the prover 
and the verifier. This is of course a stochastic variable depending on P's 
and v’s random choices. 
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DEFINITION. A given PO V is a-complete for a language, L, if for all 
w  E L the probability that V accepts on w  is at least a. 
DEFINITION. A verifier, V, is /?-sound for a language, L, if for all P’ ++ V 
and all w  4 L the probability that V rejects on w  is at least p. 
Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff (1985) defined the class IP as follows. 
L is in IP[f(n)] if there exists an interacting prover-verifier pair, PO F’, 
that exchanges at most f(n) messages (n being the length of the input) such 
that: 
(1) P ++ V is (1 - 2-“)-complete for L, and 
(2) V is (1 - 2-“)-sound for L. 
Call such a PW V an interactive proof for L. Note that membership in L 
is still efficiently verifiable since V runs in polynomial time and verifies 
membership correctly with probability very close to one. Define IP as the 
union over k of IP[nk]. 
2.1. Zero-Knowledge 
In this section we will give the formal definition of a zero-knowledge 
interactive proof for a language. We will first need some properties of 
probability distributions on strings. 
Let A(w) and B(w) be two parameterized discrete random variables. Let 
ACLI = w4 I w E L} and similarly define B[L]. We say that A [L] is 
degree d bounded if 
3dVwELVyEA(w), IYI = lwld. 
We define three types of equivalence between A [L] and B[L]. 
(1) ACLI =p NLI or A [L] is perfectly equivalent to B[ L] if for all 
y, and all w  E L, 
Pr[A(w) = y] = Pr[B(w) = y]. 
(2) ACLI -suc,,v) BCLI or A [L] is (k, TV)-statistically equivalent to 
B[L] if for all w  E L, 1 WI > N, 
1 
F IPrCA(w) = ~1 -PO(w) = yll <p. 
(3) ACLI =C(k.N) B[L] or A [L] is (k, N)-computationally equivalent 
to B[L] if whenever A[L] and B[L] are degree d bounded then for all 
circuit families, C, of size I WI k, and all w  E L, I WI > N, 
IPrCClw14.4w))= ll-Pr[CIwId@(W))= 111 G&, 
where C, is the circuit of C which takes inputs of size n. 
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We have already seen what it means for an interacting prover-verifier 
pair to be an interactive proof for a language. In a cryptographic setting, 
however, we may require more from our protocol than just completeness 
and soundness. We may want the prover to give nothing to any verifier 
(even those not following the protocol) that the verifier could not have 
computed itself. To formalize this Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff (1985) 
introduced the important concept of a simulator. A simulator, IV, is a 
random Turing machine that produces strings, i.e., “conversations,” in 
expected polynomial time. 
Let M(w) be the random variable associated with M on input w. Recall 
that P c* I’(w) is the random variable associated with the conversations 
produced by PO V on input w. We will say that P is statistical zero- 
knowledge for L if Vk 3N such that VV’ 3M.. such that 
Define the class SZK to be those languages, L, for which there exists an 
interactive prover-verifier pair, P- V, such that 
(1) Po V is (I-2-“)-complete on L, 
(2) V is (1 - 2-“)-sound on L, and 
(3) P is statistical zero-knowledge for L. 
Call such a PO V a statistical zero-knowledge proof for L. 
By using the definitions for perfect equivalence and computational 
equivalence from above we get similar definitions for perfect zero- 
knowledge (SZK), and computational zero-knowledge (CZK). 
Several paper have noted that the above definitions may not be restric- 
tive enough. For example, the prover cannot be sure that the verifier’s 
worktapes are empty when both parties receive the input. For example, the 
worktapes may not have been cleared after the verifier completed a 
previous interaction with another prover. This was noted in (Goldwasser, 
Micali, and Rackoff, 1989; Oren, 1987; Tompa and Woll, 1987). The 
following definitions handle these cases. 
Let PO V(w, U) denote the random variable for the output of the 
protocol on input w  when V runs in polynomial time in IwI but has addi- 
tional input u that is unknown to P. Let M(w, u) be the random variable 
for the output of the simulator on input w, u where the simulator runs in 
polynomial time in 1~1. P is statistical zero-knowledge’ on L if Vk 3N such 
that VV’ 3M,,, such that 
Mv CL X c*l =.ss(~,N, P- V’[LxiF]. 
The requirements for P to be perfect zero-knowledge’ on L and computa- 
tional zero-knowledge’ on L are similar. 
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Now we can define the class SZK’. The classes PZK’ and CZK’ are 
defined similarly. A language, L, is in SZK’ if there exists an interactive 
prover-verifier pair such that 
(1) PH Vis (1-2-“)-complete on L, 
(2) V is (1 - 2-“)-sound on L, and 
(3) P is statistical zero-knowledge’ on L. 
Call such a PO V a statistical zero-knowledge’ proof for L. 
The zero-knowledge’ definitions were designed so that zero-knowledge’ 
proofs would be modular. Tompa and Woll (1987) demonstrated that if a 
zero-knowledge’ protocol is iterated sequentially then the resulting 
protocol is zero-knowledge’. Oren (1987) showed more generally that if a 
protocal is composed only of zero-knowledge’ subprotocols then the 
protocol itself is zero-knowledge’. 
In this paper we study relativized zero-knowledge proofs. In this case 
both the prover and the verifier have access to an oracle A. As far as we 
know this is the first attempt to study relativized zero-knowledge protocols. 
3. AN ORACLE A SUCH THAT SZKA[2]#BPPA. 
In this section we will prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1. There exists an oracle, A, such that SZKA [2] # BPPA. 
As is standard for relativized separation arguments, we first define a map 
from an arbitrary set of strings, A c C*, to a set of unary strings, L,. We 
then proceed to show that there exists an A such that L, is in SZKA[2] 
but not in BPPA. Let a” be the characteristic vector of A n C”. That is, 
a:=loiEAnZ”. 
Divide the first L2”/3n_l of a” into segments of length 3n. We will ignore the 
remaining portions of a”. Let sj denote the jth segment, i.e., the positions 
1+ 3n(j- 1) to 3nj. For each string, u, of length 3n define R, as the 
segments which have value LX R, = {i 1 si = u}. We will say a” is unique 
whenever IR,I 6 1 for all strings v of length 3n. Below we will also need the 
following definitions. Call an redundant whenever there are exactly 
LJ2”/3n] v with L-j < IR,/ d Lm J + 2 and IR,I = 0 for the 
remaining u. Call a” completely redundant if it is the zero vector of 
length 2”. 
We define the unary language L, as follows: 
1" E L, 0 a” is unique. 
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We show that there exists an oracle, A, such that L, E SZKA[2] but 
L, 4 BPPA. As a first step let us show that there are many oracles for 
which L, E IPA [2]. 
LEMMA 1. Zf A is such that for all n either a” is unique, redundant, or 
completely redundant then L, E IPA[2]. 
ProoJ: Consider the following interactive protocol. On input 1”: 
1. V uniformy picks a number j between 1 and L2”/3n _I. V asks 3n 
oracle queries to discover segment si of a*. Call this 3n bit string c. V sends 
c to P. 
2. If none of the segments of a” are the string c then P responds “you 
cheat.” If c occurs as segment(s) si,, sh, . . . . si,, P returns kc {i,, iz, . . . . il}, 
3. If k = j then the verifier accepts, otherwise it rejects. 
We have to prove that P can win the game with high probability 
precisely when 1” E LA. If 1” E LA then by definition a” is unique and the 
prover will know that c is the jth segment of an. Hence, the verifier will 
accept with probability one. If 1” 4 LA then by hypothesis an is redundant 
or completely redundant. Hence, there are at least L-1 segments 
which are the same as c. So, the prover will only be able to guess j of the 
verifier with probability at most LmJ-‘. 1 
Henceforth, we will restrict our attention to oracles A such that an is 
either unique, redundant, or completely redundant. We have to construct 
A to simultaneously acheive LA E SZKA[2] and L$ BPPA. We will first 
treat these two conditions separately and then show how to combine the 
two requirements. 
3.1. Diagonalization over BPP 
We will use the standard technique of diagonalization. We will need an 
enumeration of oracle-BPP machines: M<, M$, . . . . We will set A in rounds 
so that at round i, Mf will not BPP-recognize LA. We will say that a 
machine strong BPP-recognizes a language if it erroneously accepts or 
rejects with probability at most 2-“. The following lemma will establish 
that it is sufficient to set A in rounds so that at round i, Mf will not strong 
BPP-recognize LA. 
LEMMA 2. Any language, L, in BPPA can be recognized by a machine, 
MA, which erroneously accepts or rejects with probability at most 2-” where 
n is the length of the input. 
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Proof As is standard, MA simulates the machine recognizing L a poly- 
nomial number of times and accepts if a majority of the similations 
accept. m 
Now back to the diagonalization. We assume without loss of generality 
that Mf runs in time at most n’ on inputs of length n. We will determine 
A in rounds by putting strings in and out of the oracle set. A string which 
has not yet been put in or our of A will be called undetermined. 
The general idea of the construction is to ensure that at round i either 
1”~ L, but Pr[Mf accepts l”‘] < 1 - 2-” or l”# LA but Pr[M” accepts 
l”‘] > 2-Y In both cases we have ensured that M:’ does not strong BPP- 
recognize LA. 
Let m, for i= 1,2, . . . be defined by minmG,(m2’+ 1’22--m’2 < l/2). Let 
nl, n2, . . . be a sequence of integers defined by n, = max(20, m, } and n,. = 
max(niI : + 1, mi) for i = 2, 3, . . . . For all x not of length nj for some i set 
x $ A. Now we will set the strings of length nj in rounds. 
Round i. Run h4; on input 1 “I. Note that since M, can run for time at 
most nj it cannot ask about strings of length ni+, or greater. So when M4 
asks A about a string y we have 3 cases: lyl = nj for j< i, 1 y[ # nj for 
1 < j< i + 1, and I yil = n,. In the first case the answer has already been 
determined in a previous round and in the second case the answer was 
determined ahead of time. Thus the probability that Mf accepts is only a 
function of the answers to questions of the third type, i.e., function of a”‘. 
Note that no strings of length n, have been set in previous rounds since ni 
is greater than the running time of M, on 1”” for k < i. Let ~(a”‘) = Pr,[Mf 
accepts l”‘] where r is the random coins used by Mf. We have two cases: 
1. Thee exists a redundant a”’ such that p(a”‘) > 2-“I. In this case we 
set A according to this a”‘. 
2. If no redundant u”! exists with ~(a”‘) > 2-“1 find a unique a”’ with 
~(a”<) < 5 and set A accordingly. 
Clearly if this construction is possible we can make any BPP machine 
make an error. We need only check that part 2 of the construction is 
possible. Lemma 3 will establish that this is indeed the case. Let U be 
the set of all an1 which are unique and R be the set of all a”’ which are 
redundant. 
LEMMA 3. Zf p(a”‘) < 2-“I for all a”‘E R then the fraction of U with 
p(a”J) < 4 is > 1 - 22-“1. 
Let us start by giving the intuition behind the proof. Oracle BPP 
machines behave similarly on both unique and redundant oracle vectors. In 
essence this is due to the fact that it is difficult for oracle BPP machines to 
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distinguish between unique and redundant oracle vectors. In a redundant 
vector there are exponentially many different values in the segments. It is 
very unlkely that a BPP machine sampling a polynomial number of 
segments will find a pair of segments with identical value. To make this for- 
mal we will fix the random coins of MA and now look at the probability 
that M;4 accepts as a function of random a”‘. We have 
h4MA 4. For fixed random coins r, 
Pr [Mf accepts] < 
Pr a”,E R CM4 accepts1 
CTJE cl 1 _ nc+ l/2 I 2-““2 . 
Proof: Once we fix the random coins of Mf it becomes deterministic 
and its computation depends only on a”!. Consider an accepting computa- 
tion during which Mf examines k segments. Let mR be the number of 
redundant a”’ on which MA would produce this computation (i.e., which 
have the same values at those k segments) and let mu be the number of 
unique ani on which Mf would produce this same computation. Assume for 
now that the values of these k segments are unique. We have 
and 
a” ,rR [k specified segments have unique values]. 
We have to estimate the last probability. The probability that any two 
segments are equal is 
,LJ2”13nJ+l<~+1= 1 4n 
L2”/3nj - 1 2”/3n - 1 J5qi-lG F $ 
for n > 20. Since we have (‘;) < k2/2 different pairs that could be equal we 
have Pr,., E R [k chosen segments are unique] 2 1 - k2 &,2-“1’~. Since 
k<n’ we have 
mR u -am (1 -jp+u2 
IN IUI ’ 
2 - r4/2). 
The inequality is obvious in the case when the values of the k segments 
are not all unique. Now Lemma 4 follows by summing over all possible 
accepting computations. 1 
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Let us now prove Lemma 3. By the hypothesis ~(a”‘) ~2~“~ for all 
an’ E R. It follows that 
Pr [M,A accepts l”*] < 2-“5. 
r.u”l E R 
By Lemma 4 and the choice of ni 
Pr [MA accepts 1 “$1 d 2 Pr [MA accepts l”~] < 2’ - nd r. Llni E ” r,a”i E R 
which in its turn implies 
Pr [Aa”‘) > 41 = Pr [Pr [Mf accepts 1 “‘12 $1~ 22--n,, 1 “nls u u”isu ? 
3.2. Statistical Zero Knowledge 
We have seen how to diagonalize over all oracle BPP machines. Now we 
will show that for many A the two round protocol for recognizing L, 
described earlier is in fact a statistical zero knowledge protocol. 
We will show that for any verifier, I”, there is a polynomial time coin 
flipping simulator, MA,. , which for all 1 n E L, produces conversations with 
close to the same distribution as the PA c-) VA protocol. To make precise 
what is meant by close define S,.(8) as the difference between the 
distributions of conversations on input l”, 
S..(a”) = C (Pr[PA e-, VA(ln)=x, Y]-Pr[M$(l” 
.x. ., 
)=x7 Yll, 
where x denotes the verifier’s move and y denotes the prover’s move. 
Strictly speaking the value of SV(a”) does not only depend on a” since V’ 
might ask questions of lengths other than n. However, we assume any fixed 
set of answers for strings shorter than n and that any string the verifer asks 
for the length greater than n gets a negative answer. Observe that this 
agrees with the situation in the diagonalization over BPP-machines. 
To prove that the protocol is SZK we have to prove that S,,(8) < l/nc 
for all c and sufficiently large n. 
The intuition for the proof is quite clear. If we are dealing with an honest 
verifier which behaves according to the protocol then for unique a” the 
verifier does not learn anything when the prover reveals the location of the 
segment that the verifier itself chose. It is easy to simulate the honest 
verifier. The simulator simply runs V to get j and c = sj and reports that the 
prover responds with j. On the other hand, consider a verifier which 
produces c without looking at the oracle. In this case the verifier could 
learn the position of c in a” from the prover even though it would be dif- 
ficult for the verifier to discover this for itself. However, with overwhelming 
probability c will not be a segment in a” since there are 2’” strings of length 
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3n but only L2”/3n J segments of un. Thus the simulator could report “you 
cheat” as the prover’s mover and be correct almost always. Let us describe 
the simulator in more detail. 
DEFINITION OF SIMULATOR. On input l”, the simulator runs VA which 
produces a string c. Next the simulator queries the oracle to obtain all 
segments of un in which VA has asked at least one question. If one of these 
segments is equal to c, M,. returns its index as the provers answer and 
otherwise it returns “you cheat.” 
Given this definition of Mt. let us evaluate S,,(a”). Note that VA and 
M$. produce c with the same distribution. If c is not one of the segments 
of a” then both the real prover and the simulator prover respond “you 
cheat.” So the sum over those c which are not segments of a” contributes 
zero to S,,(a”). Say c is the jth segment of un and the jth segment was 
examined by VA during the production of c. This happens with the same 
probability for both Va and M$ and in both cases the prover’s response 
is j. So again, the sum over such c’s contributes zero to S,(a”). Say, c is 
the jth segment of u” but the jth segment was not examined during the 
production of c. Again this occurs with the same probability for both V’A 
and M$ but in the former case the real prover will respond with j and the 
simulator prover will respond “you cheat.” This is the only case the 
simulator will not be able to simulate. 
Let D(r, a”, c) be the event that the verifier with coins r and oracle vector 
u” produces c which is a segment of un but the verifier makes no queries 
to that segment. By the above argument S,.(a”) reduces to 
S,.(d) = 2 1 Pr [D(r, un, b)]. 
h r 
LEMMA 5. For any V’ and any n 
Pr 
a”EcJ [ 
SV(a”)>& <$ 1 
ProoJ: We show that the expected value of S,,(a”) taken over an E U is 
at most 2/22”3n and this implies the lemma. The expectation of S,.(a”) 
over an e U is 
Treat the probability over r as a sum over r weighted by 2-p, where p is 
the number of coins used by the verifier. Change the order of summation 
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to sum over r first and c last. Then note that once r and u” are fixed c is 
determined. So ignore the sum over c. We get 
E(S,,(a”)) = $7 aQu CWr, 01. 
Fix r. Clearly if the machine looks at k segments and then produces a 
string c which is not equal to one of these segments then the probability 
that c is a segment of a random unique a” is 
Thus E(S.,(~“))<2(3n2~“)-’ and the lemma follows. 1 
3.3. Interleaving the Two Conditions 
Let us see how to choose our oracle to ensure that our language is 
statistical zero-knowledge while diagonalizing over oracle BPP machines. 
We only need a slight modification to the procedure in Section 3.1: let 
VI, v2, ... be an enumeration of probabilistic polynomial time Turing 
machines and replace condition 2 by 2’. 
2’. If no redundant u”, exists with p(u”‘) > 2 -‘I find a unique u”’ with 
~(a”#) < 4 and such that s,(u”‘) < 2/2”3n, for j= 1,2, . . . . i. Set A according 
to this a”‘. 
Observe that by Lemmas 3 and 5 a random u”, satisfies the two condi- 
tions with probability > 1 - (4 + i)2-“I> 0 and thus there is such an a”‘. 
Finally, to conclude that the construction is correct we need to verify the 
following conditions. 
1. A is well defined. 
2. For any n, u” is unique, redundant, or completely redundant. 
3. No BPPA machine recognizes L,. 
4. Every Vi can be simulated. 
Let us verify these conditions one at the time. 
(1) We need only observe that no strings of length 2 ni are set under 
the first i - 1 rounds. This is true since ni > n: for k < i and thus no A4: can 
ask about any string of length n, during its computation, 
(2) If n = ni for some i, un is either redundant or unique according to 
the rules 1 and 2 in the construction. For all other n, u” is completely 
redundant. 
(3) By the construction Mf makes an error on input 1”l. 
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(4) Observe that this is only a condition when 1” EL. We know by 
condition 2’ in the construction that the distance between the distribution 
generated by P and Vi on input 1” and the distribution generated by M,,, 
on 1 n is < 2/2”3n for n > ni. The definition of zero-knowledge requires that 
for all k there exists an N such that for all n b N the error is at most I@. 
To achieve this we simply encode into every M,, the protocol followed by 
Pand Vion l”forn<nisothatMV~(l”)=P+-+Vi(l”)foralln<n,.Now 
for all k choose N such that 2/2N3N < l/Nk. 
This finishes the proof of Theorem 1. 
4. AN ORACLE SUCH THAT PZK[21B # BPPB. 
Using an idea of Oded Goldreich we show how to modify the language 
and the oracle to prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2. There exists an oracle, B, such that PZKB[2] g BPP’. 
We define a new language Lb which is very similar to the previous 
language. This time we let b” denote the characteristic vector of elements 
of B with leading 0 and length n + 1. That is, 
bl= loOiEBnC”+‘. 
Now we define a unary language Lk by 
6” unique o 1” E Lb. 
Again we will make sure that 6” is either unique, redundant, or completely 
redundant. 
The key difference is that we will use strings in the oracle starting with 
1 as a dictionary. We let lx E B iff 1x1 = 3n and x is a segment of 6”. We 
will call the characteristic vector of this “dictionary” part d”: for Ii/ = 3n 
The proof of Theorem 2 will be very similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and 
hence we omit some details. 
4.1. Diagonalization over BPP 
As before we start with an enumeration of oracle-BPP machines: 
Mf, M ;, . . . . Let mi and nj be defined as before. For all x not of length ni 
for some i set Ox $ B. Also for all x not of length 3n, for some i set lx $ B. 
Again we will determine the remainder of the oracle in rounds. 
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Round i Run MB on input 1”‘. As when setting oracle A, the limitation 
on the running times of M, for 1 < j 6 i and the values of nj for 1 G j < i 
ensure that the probability that My accepts is only a function of questions 
of the form Ox where x is of length n, or Ix where x is of length 3ni. Define 
p(b”l) = Pr, [MB accepts l”] and as before we have two cases. 
1. There exists a redundant b”I such that p(b”‘) > 2-“I. In this case we 
set B according to this b”l. That is, 1”’ is not in Lh but Ms fails to strong 
BPP reject it. 
2. If no redundant b”l exists with p(b”l) > 2 pn’ find a unique b”l with 
p(b”l) 6 4 and set B accordingly. That is, 1”’ is in Lk but A4: fails to strong 
BPP accept it. 
To verify the construction we need the following equivalent of Lemma 3. 
LEMMA 6. If p(b”$) ~2~“’ for u/l b”‘E R then the fraction of U with 
p(b”‘) < 4 is 3 1 - 6.2-“1. 
The proof of Lemma 6 is, of course, very similar to the proof of 
Lemma 3. However, there are some additional complications due to the 
dictionary. To take care of these problems we need the following definition. 
DEFINITION. A machine M makes a discovery if on input 1” it asks B 
about a string lx, 1x1= 3n, IXE B and it has not asked any oracle ques- 
tion(s) about a segment of b” with value x. 
We get the following lemma. 
LEMMA 7. The probability that a probabilistic polynomial time machine, 
A4, which runs in time n’, makes a discovery is <nip ‘/3 . 22”. The probability 
is taken over the coin flips of the machine and over a random b” from either 
R or U. 
Proof: Fix r. Consider any question “IXE B” with 1x1 = 3n. The 
probability that x will be a segment of 6” which the machine has not yet 
seen is d 1/3n22”. Since A4 asks at most ni questions the lemma follows. 1 
Let us use this lemma to prove Lemma 6. Consider the set of b”!, r which 
makes MB accept. This set is divided into equivalence classes with pairs 
giving the same computation of MB in the same equivalence class. We 
know that when b”l is given probabilities according to R the total mass of 
accepting conversations is at most 2-“I. When bnJ is given probabilities 
according to V we have accepting conversations of two types: Computa- 
tions where MB makes a discovery and computations where it does not. By 
Lemma 7 the mass corresponding to the first case is bounded by 
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n:- l/3 . 22”1 < 2-“l. Modifying the analysis of Lemma 4 slightly we see that 
the mass of the second type of conversations contributes at most twice the 
mass of the corresponding conversations with b”‘E R. Thus 
Pr [Mfaccepts 1”1]~22”1+2.2--“1~3.2-“1 
r. h” E u 
which implies that 
Pr [Pr [MS accepts l”~] > $1~ 6.2~“~. 
b”e.9 r 
I 
4.2. Perfect Zero-Knowledge 
To take care of the perfect zero-knowledge requirement we have to 
change the simulator. 
DEFINITION OF SIMULATOR. On input l”, the simulator runs v’ and 
produces a question c. Next the simulator checks if lc E B. If not it returns 
“you cheat.” If lc E B the simulator asks the oracle questions to obtain all 
segments of b” in which V’ has asked at least one question. If one of these 
segments is equal to c, M,. returns its index as the prover’s answer. If not 
M,, asks the 2” oracle questions Ox E B to locate the segment of 6” with 
value c and returns the position of the segment. 
We need to check that this simulator runs in expected polynomial time 
for any vernier. Assume that the running time of Vi is nj. The crucial 
lemma is: 
LEMMA 8. The probability that M,, runs in time >3r1j+~ is 
<nj- l/3 . 22*. Furthermore, M “, never runs for longer than n2” + 3nj+ 2 
steps. The probability here is taken over random b” E U and r, the random 
coins of the machine. 
ProoJ We need only analyze how long M,, runs in the different cases. 
If lc $ B then M,, runs in time ni + n. If c occurs as one of the segments 
that Vi looked at, the running time is at most ni+2 + nj+ n < 3nj+2. In the 
last case we get the bound n2” + ni+ 2 + ni + n. To finish the proof we need 
only observe that to get into the last case the verifier has to make a 
discovery and hence we can use Lemma 7. 1 
However, we are more interested in probabilities over r for a fixed choice 
of b” and this is taken care of by our last lemma. 
LEMMA 9. For a fraction 1 - 2-” of U the expected running time of M,; 
is bounded by 4nj+ ’ for all j. 
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Proof By Lemma 8 the fraction of U for which M, has probability 
>2j2njp l/3.2” of running in time >,3nj+* is <2-“(2j*)-‘. Thus the 
fraction of U where this condition is violated for any j is bounded by 
2-” xzj 1/2j* < 2-“. If the condition is not violated, the expected running 
time is bounded by 
jnj+* + 2j2nJ- ' -n2”<4nif2. 1 
3.2” 
4.3. Interleaving the Two Conditions 
Now combining Sections 4.1 and 4.2 to prove Theorem 2 is easy. We 
change condition 2’ in the BPP construction to: 
2”. If no redundant b”l with p(b”l) > 2-“1 exists find a unique b”! with 
p(b”‘) < 4 and such that M,, runs in expected time 4nj+* for all j. Set B 
according to this b”l. 
We just need to observe that, by Lemmas 6 and 9, a random b”l satisfies 
the two conditions with probability > 1 - 7 .2-“l> 0. A simple verification 
similar to that in Section 3.3 finishes the proof of Theorem 2. 1 
5. REMARKS 
We remark here about the relative strength of PZK and SZK. Recall our 
relativized PZK language L’. Occasionally, the simulator was required to 
make an exponential search of Ox (1x1 = 2”) because the verifier produced 
a segment of b” without making queries in the segment. Importantly, the 
simulator knew when it was necessary to make such a search (by looking 
in the dictionary) and the search was rarely necessary. This is precisely the 
same way in which all known SZK languages also have perfect zero- 
knowledge simulators (as noted in (Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff, 
1989)). The perfect simulator can determine when it is necessary to make 
an exponential time computation and the computation is rarely necessary. 
However, our SZK language does not seem to have this property. When 
the verifier has produced a string but has not made queries in a segment 
of the oracle which looks like the string, the simulator has no way of 
knowing whether the string is a segment of b”, i.e., whether to make an 
exponential search. It seems that in order for a simulation to be perfect it 
must make the exponential search whenever the above occurs, but such a 
simulation certainly will not run in expected polynomial time. 
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